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Introduction 
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, is Chapman University's electronic journal of undergraduate 
student research, and will feature recent scholarly research and creative work by Chapman's undergraduates from 
across the curriculum, essays as well as work in a variety of other media. We invite you to read, peruse, or just take 
in our offerings from the best of our undergraduate students' work, and hope that you will be stimulated, 
intrigued, and enlightened, and that you will look forward with anticipation to future issues. 
From the perspective of the editors at e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, we hope to accomplish 
several goals at once with this electronic journal. First, e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work provides our 
students an opportunity to distribute their best work. e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work also provides 
the greater Chapman community with a select sample of the significant research Chapman students conduct, 
reflecting the academic mission at the heart of the University. Finally, e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate 
Work provides a means whereby outside scholars and interested others can access research relevant to their 
scholarship and other interests, enlarging the compass of our academic and creative endeavors across the virtual 
globe, thus providing a window onto our community.  
The fundamental mission of e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work is to present its readers with the best 
and most interesting undergraduate student work, which may include shorter pieces alongside more lengthy 
scholarly work. Contributions to e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work may be made directly, or through 
faculty recommendation. Scholarly and other work published in e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will 
have undergone review for substance and currency through faculty screening, with a subsequent editorial staff 
review for quality, style, and fit. e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will also request contributions to 
themed issues, such as this inaugural issue featuring those student essays selected for presentation during a recent 
campus event honoring retired four-star general in the United States Army and former Secretary of State Colin 
Luther Powell.  
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work invites its readers' comments. Letters to the Editor regarding the 
content of any current issue can be sent to Gordon Babst gbabst@chapman.edu, placing "e-Research: A Journal of 
Undergraduate Work - reader comments" in the subject line. Selected reader comments and student responses 
will appear in the subsequent issue. 
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Some specifics about e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work 
Published three times a year, coinciding with the Chapman University's fall, spring, and summer semester 
schedule.  
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will be distributed electronically to the entire Chapman community. 
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will be archived, allowing scholars and other interested parties 
outside the Chapman community to access and cite its content using persistent URLs. 
Executive Editor: Gordon A. Babst, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Political Science, Chapman University.  
Future issues of e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work will include a student editorial staff. 
 
Some specifics about Chapman University 
The mission of Chapman University is to provide personalized education of distinction that leads to inquiring, 
ethical and productive lives as global citizens. 
Chapman University, founded in 1861, is one of the oldest, most prestigious private universities in California. 
Chapman's picturesque campus is located in the heart of Orange County - one of the nation's most exciting centers 
of arts, business, science and technology - and draws outstanding students from across the United States and 
around the world. Known for its blend of liberal arts and professional programs, Chapman University encompasses 
seven schools and colleges: Wilkinson College of Humanities and Social Sciences, George L. Argyros School of 
Business and Economics, Lawrence and Kristina Dodge College of Film and Media Arts, Schmid College of Science, 
College of Performing Arts, School of Law and College of Educational Studies. 
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On Shaky Grounds: Reasons behind the failure to adhere to the "Powell 
Doctrine" in the 2003 Iraq invasion 
Sasha Anderson 
Why did we go to war with Iraq and what are we still doing there? This question is one of our most pressing foreign 
policy issues and continues to be hotly debated by politicians, journalists and citizens. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was executed in a strikingly different fashion than the strategy used in an earlier conflict with Iraq, the Persian Gulf 
War of 1990-1991. Rather than follow a strategy consisting of clear goals, overwhelming force and a 
predetermined exit strategy, the US military blundered into Iraq in 2003 without a way to measure victory and 
without a plan for how to extract themselves from the conflict. This murky strategy in no way resembles the policy 
that became known as the "Powell Doctrine" that was so well implemented in Iraq in the 1990s. Though the two 
conflicts involve the same opposition and similar motivations, the Powell Doctrine was not followed in 2003, 
potentially due to lack of US and international support, a changing media environment, the ambiguity of the 
phrase "war on terror," and the political ambitions of George W. Bush.  
The Persian Gulf War was a model implementation of the "Powell Doctrine." This doctrine, coined for Powell's 
impressive use of it, outlines a formula for the proper assessment of threat, advocates the use of overwhelming 
force when invasion is approved, and provides for a clear exit strategy tied to a specific definition of victory agreed 
upon before aggression is initiated. The roots of this policy lie in Powell's experience in the Vietnam War, where he 
was able to observe first-hand the mistakes of the US government during his two tours in the country (Powell 148).  
The repercussions of invasion without a clear plan and without the necessary numbers to take control of a region 
became clear to Powell in Vietnam. He later described conflict in Vietnam as a "halfhearted half-war, with much of 
the nation opposed or indifferent, while a small fraction carried the burden" (Powell 148). In response to this 
observation, Powell went on the argue that "war should be the politics of last resort, and when we go to war, we 
should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize the country's resources to 
fulfill that mission and then go in to win" (148). Instead, Vietnam lost thousands of American lives, failed to achieve 
clear success, and left United States citizens disillusioned with the military (Campbell 1998). Shortly after this 
conflict, confidence sank so low that there was talk of dismantling much of the military. The scramble to keep a 
strong military force intact led to a policy of reluctance that was championed by Powell and ostensibly remains 
today (Campbell 1998).  
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From this on-the-ground experience, Powell went on to serve under Caspar Weinberger, who was the original 
advocate of clear planning and overwhelming force. Weinberger was able to pass on to Powell six major tenants 
that would serve as the foundation for Powell's foreign policy strategy. Powell himself clearly states the roots of his 
beliefs in his biography My American Journey, in a passage outlining an address at the National Press Club. Powell 
describes these tests to be: 
1) Commit only if our or our allies' vital interests are at stake. 2) If we commit, do so with all the resources 
necessary to win. 3) Go in only with clear political and military objectives. 4) Be ready to change the commitment if 
the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still. 5) Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the 
American people and the Congress. 6) Commit US forces only as a last resort (303). 
This strategy for the use of military force was followed effectively by the first Bush administration during the 
Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, where Powell served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though debate 
remains about whether the US should have stayed longer in the Gulf, it is generally looked upon as a success. The 
US had the support of the international community and was able to quickly exit once the terms for victory were 
met (Sifry 492). Rather than linger to fight new, small battles, troops were recalled after the 100th hour and Iraq 
began its retreat out of Kuwait.  
The first condition that needs to be established, according to the Powell Doctrine, is whether a given situation 
constitutes a threat to national security. As they were positioned on the border of Kuwait, Iraqi forces would have 
been able to push the conflict into Saudi Arabia, destabilizing the entire region (Sifry 19). This was a threat to a 
Saudi Arabia and had the potential to destabilize the region, and thus member states of the United Nations were in 
support of an attack to push back the Iraqi forces as there was no way to tell if Saddam had intentions to drive his 
force into Saudi Arabia. The United States was also personally concerned with strategic oil interests and 
international concern for the independence of Kuwait, which led to the decision that the situation was indeed a 
threat to security (Sifry 22). Leading up to the release of US troops, the United Nations Security Council issued 
Resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and called for immediate Iraqi 
withdrawal.  
After identifying the invasion of Kuwait to be a significant threat to the U.S., Colin Powell and Defense Secretary 
Dick Cheney came before the Senate Armed Forces Committee to show them the merit of an invasion and to ask 
for their support in the effort (Powell 493). The backing of the United Nations was also gained in the Security 
Council meeting that voted to approve the use of "all necessary means" (UN Resolution 687). This decision passed 
with a vote of 12-2 in favor of the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Many other countries committed soldiers 
to the attack.  
Once the need to intervene was established and the general American public and world at large were in favor of 
intervention, large quantities of troops were assembled in order to quickly force back the Iraqi troops with as few 
Western casualties as possible. In the region there eventually built up "539,000 American troops in the Gulf along 
6
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/e-Research/vol1/iss1/1
  On Shaky Grounds 
  e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010)   5 
with 270,000 Allied troops from more than two dozen nations, the largest deployment of land troops and air 
power since World War II" (The History Place). This is an overwhelming amount of force given that Kuwait is only 
about 2/3 the size of the state of Vermont. The military also planned an attack using all forms of offense, not just 
responding with less troop-intensive air strikes. Though many in power, including the president, repeatedly asked 
if air strikes would suffice, Powell and others were adamant that more force would be needed. As Powell put it 
"we were planning a full campaign - air, land, sea, and space - to remove the decision from Saddam's hands" 
(Powell 476).  
After amassing an overwhelming force, President Bush and his military advisors continued with Powell Doctrine 
strategizing by deciding that Iraq's retreat from Kuwait would be the measure of victory in Operation Desert Storm 
(Powell 520). Powell recommended that troops be removed once it was clear that the Iraqi forces had been 
sufficiently controlled and were on their way out. In hindsight, Powell reflected that "we were fighting a limited 
war under a limited mandate for a limited purpose, which was soon going to be achieved. I thought that the 
people responsible ought to start thinking about how to end it" (Powell 519). This was done in response to Powell's 
fear that the military and US government would continue to find small battles that would keep US forces in the 
region indefinitely. Instead, the conflict was called to an end on the one-hundredth hour of war. President Bush 
clearly stated that the mission had been achieved by saying, "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated, our 
military objectives are met" (qtd. in Powell 523).  
There it was, the neat, clean, 100-hour war in which the United States was able to meet a clear military objective 
with the support of the international community and then to withdraw from conflict. So how has the United States 
come from this successful beginning to an ongoing war that, with President Obama's recent withdrawal 
announcement, may last seven years (Baker)? The uses of military force against Iraq in 1990 and 2003 share very 
similar motivations, both strategic and ideological. It seems strange that a conflict with the same country and with 
some overlapping motivations was handled so differently. These similarities included the strategic need for oil, the 
threat of Saddam Hussein, a fear of weapons of mass destruction, and an ideological focus on the intolerability of 
Iraq's actions in the region. 
Both invasions were clearly a struggle over oil resources, with Iraq claiming historical ties in order to conquer 
strategic regions of Kuwait (Sifry 17). As for America, we are the top consumer in the oil industry, and logically 
have a stake in making sure that these resources remain available to us at a balanced, market-driven price (EIA). 
Daniel Yergin, the head of a leading energy research firm, proposes three reasons why the oil argument cannot be 
discarded (Sifry 23). The first is that the use of oil has been directly tied to the emergence of modern capitalism 
and business. Oil has remained among the greatest industries for decades and its changes are not just reported in 
the business section, but rather it is the talk of front page news stories. This shows the extent to which the global 
economy is tied to oil and how fluctuations in that market have far-reaching effects that echo into all aspects of 
our lives. Because of this centrality, Yergin proposes the second reason for oil as a motivation to be its role in 
geopolitics and global power. The use of oil in combat machinery makes it an indispensible resource for any nation 
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aspiring to achieve regional or global dominance. The fact that the United States has to import a large share of its 
oil means that we are inevitably tied to the conflicts that arise over oil, and hence our involvement in Kuwait in 
1990 and Iraq in 2003. The final reason it is so clear that oil does indeed need to be viewed as a motivation for 
both conflicts is the fact that modern American life is structured around oil. It allows us to build decentralized 
suburbs and to drive rather than build public transportation. This has led some to call us a "Hydrocarbon Society," 
in which oil makes possible the way we live, work, travel and even to how we date (Sifry 25). Oil has become such 
an integral part of American society that Yergin makes the claim that we are a "civilization that would collapse if 
the world's oil wells suddenly went dry." Clearly then, our society has a need for oil and is inevitably going to be 
concerned whenever there is conflict surrounding this resource.  
Another similarity between the two conflicts is that both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush harbored a 
hatred of Saddam and hoped to see him removed from power. Some of this antagonism may be valid, given the 
grave human rights abuses conducted in Iraq. But there are many other authoritarian regimes that exist in the 
region, yet Saddam was a particular enemy of both presidents. In his speech announcing the start of the Persian 
Gulf War, Bush sensationally spoke of Saddam's actions, saying, "Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, 
and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities -- 
and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children" (Bush 1991). George W. Bush also spoke of Saddam in 
sensationalized terms, implicating his regime in an "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address. He then 
went on to imply he had a personal grudge against Saddam due to the conflict during his father's presidency 
(Fisher).  
From this personal animosity, both built ideological platforms on which to base their wars. In 1990, Bush famously 
stated "we will not let this aggression stand" and went on to lay the groundwork for continuing US concern with 
Iraq by saying, "there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf, our role 
then is to deter future aggression" (qtd. in Tuathail 133). This speech became the slogan "this will not stand" 
symbolizing a moral stance against the actions of Iraq. His son created a similar slogan, the "war on terror" which 
was used to evoke the same feeling of emotional patriotism. Both campaigns were constructed to win the support 
of the American people and elicit an emotional response to the issue. On March 18, 2003, in his ultimatum speech 
to Saddam, Bush stated that "the regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep 
hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al 
Qaeda," thus linking Iraq to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 (Bush 2003).  
Finally, in both wars the threat of weapons of mass destruction was used as a motive to enter into conflict with 
Iraq. In 1990, Bush was concerned with Saddam's stockpile of chemical weapons and sought to "curb the 
proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear technologies" (The History Place). A UN 
weapons inspection team had been involved in the area for years and it was known that Saddam has chemical and 
biological weapons, and it was anticipated that he would try and seek nuclear technology (Ritter 105). In addition, 
the UN had passed resolution 687, demanding that Saddam actually destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction so 
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that the economic sanctions may be lifted (Ritter 104). In the beginning of the next decade, the large concern from 
the presidency was the supposed presence of nuclear weapons. Colin Powell testified in front of the UN on 
February 5, 2003 saying that Saddam did indeed have nuclear technology, but the evidence for this conclusion was 
later found to be falsified (Leung). This motivation was highly vocalized in the months leading up to the war, but 
lost steam as reports came in discounting the credibility of intelligence information, and has not been used as a 
justification in the more recent years of the ongoing war (Leung).  
Given the similarities of the conflicts and rhetoric surrounding them, why was the strategy of the Persian Gulf War 
not used in the war in Iraq? Why was the 2003 conflict not ended after the fall of Saddam? Colin Powell himself 
had been pulled back into the government to serve as Secretary of State under the second George Bush. Yet, he 
was unable to apply the same principles to the second conflict in Iraq. The first tenet of the Powell Doctrine, a clear 
threat to national security, was based on shaky facts and the implementation went downhill from there.  
At the outset, the goal was to establish a clear need to invade by convincing the American public, as well as the 
international community, that Iraq was indeed building nuclear weapons and that this technology was a threat to 
our security. Following the Iraqi defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations passed resolution 687 to 
require Iraq to disclose its weapons stockpile and how they were produced (Ritter 31). In fact, the UN economic 
sanctions in response to the invasion of Kuwait were extended until Saddam handed over the weapons (a first sign 
of the lingering effect of invading bodies that Powell and others feared). In response, Saddam sought to conceal a 
good portion of his chemical, biological and potential nuclear weapons supply and to claim that he was developing 
a program for nuclear enrichment, not for building nuclear weapons, and that materials for this purpose had been 
destroyed (Ritter 34). The economic sanctions continued and Iraq was driven to poverty and hunger, so much so 
that they signed onto the "oil for food" (UN Resolution 986) agreement in which Iraq sold two billion dollars in oil 
every six months to pay for food and medicine (Ritter 149). Multiple conflicts between the UN inspections team 
and Iraq took place and the United States eventually settled into a containment strategy under the Clinton 
administration. But, the question of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was to be reawakened in light of 
September 11, 2001.  
In order to make the case for Iraq's possession of nuclear weapons, then Secretary of State Colin Powell came 
before the UN Security Council representing the United States' position. He began by making the case that Iraq had 
been evading weapons inspections for the last twelve years and that action needed to be taken by the UN Security 
Council in order to establish their authority (Powell 2003). He then went on to make the infamous claim that tubes 
found in Iraq were for enriching Uranium and had been obtained from Africa. But Powell himself admitted that it 
was not certain that the tubes were not merely being used for conventional weaponry. He stated, "these tubes are 
controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. 
By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There 
is controversy about what these tubes are for" (CNN). Powell also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
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Committee in September 2002 that Saddam had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. President Bush then 
went on to make that same claim in an infamous sixteen word sentence in his 2003 State of the Union Address.  
It is now generally accepted that this intelligence was falsified by various intelligence bodies within the 
administration to provide an excuse for entering Iraq (Leung). In fact, a new intelligence bureaucracy, the Office of 
Special Plans, was created specifically to generate information in support of the invasion of Iraq. One of this 
office's main goals was to establish the link between al-Qaeda and Iraq by pulling information from "raw" officer 
reports (Borger). Many of the officials working for the office were untrained in intelligence and pressed for time, so 
the information passed on to those in charge was based on guesses at best and outright fabrications at the worst. 
Often the information was "passed on to the national security council and the president without having been 
vetted with anyone other than political appointees" (Borger). In addition, the then CIA Director, George Tenet, 
stated after the invasion that "his agency was under pressure to justify a war that the administration had already 
decided on" (Borger). We now know that much of the intelligence used was falsified in order to create the claims 
the president was looking for. It is interesting to explore to what extent Secretary Powell was aware of the false 
nature of the information, as his testimonies, along with those of other high-ranking officials, laid the groundwork 
for a convincing war with Iraq. The use of this false information could have been due to the fact that Bush had 
been attempting to construct a solid reason for removing Saddam from power prior to the 9/11 attacks (Barstow).  
Potentially, Bush felt that Iraq had not been properly dealt with in the Persian Gulf War. Though the 
implementation of the Powell Doctrine in this operation was near to perfect, many criticized George H.W. Bush for 
pulling out too soon and not further weakening Iraq so that Saddam would not continue to be a threat in the 
future. This explanation for divergence from previous strategy stems from two motives, the personal and the 
political. Those less personally critical of George W. Bush have claimed that from a defensive military standpoint, it 
would have been smarter to have defeated Saddam the first time around when we were already involved in the 
area. This criticism may have spurred Bush to fight Iraq for the second time to in a sense deal with unfinished 
business. The other, more personal critics, claim that Bush was fulfilling a personal vendetta against Saddam 
leftover from his father's presidency (DeFrank). Evidence used for this argument is found in a speech given at a 
fund-raising dinner in Houston Texas wherein Bush stated "after all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one 
time." This offhanded statement "made some wonder whether the impulse for war reflected careful 
considerations of national security or was instead a family grudge match" observed Louis Fisher in a 2003 issuing of 
Political Science Quarterly. 
From this shaky beginning, the United States government continued to ignore the outlines of the Powell doctrine. 
The use of the phrase "war on terror" made victory an ambiguous notion. What exactly does the defeat of terror 
look like? When can we state that the US has sufficiently dealt with terror? This led to an underwhelming use of 
force. Rather than flood the area, topple Saddam, and withdraw, the plan committed a very low number of troops 
in comparison to the Gulf War. On December 21, 2002, an estimated 200,000 troops were approved to be 
deployed to the Gulf region, with British and Australian troops to follow (Brunner). War was then declared on 
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March 19 alongside the campaign Operation Iraqi Freedom. This operation involved an airstrike to overthrow 
Saddam. It is interesting to note here that George Bush Senior asked several times in the planning stages of the 
Persian Gulf War if an airstrike would be sufficient, and Colin Powell, along with others, explained that just using 
air forces would not be enough strength to quickly and thoroughly eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Yet, in contrast 
to accepted military wisdom, the first offense in the 2003 Iraq war was solely an air affront. This move was to be 
indicative of the entire war, in which not enough force has been used to take complete control of the situation. 
After a second round of air strikes on Bagdad, grounds troops finally came in the southern border of Iraq from 
Kuwait. At that point, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on March 20 that "what will follow will not be a 
repeat of any other conflict. It will be of a force and a scope and a scale that has been beyond what we have seen 
before" (Brunner). Yet, the use of force was not overwhelming. It is true that the offense against Iraq was unlike 
any other conflict, but not in that it used an incredible amount of force.  
Three days after declaring war, the Bush administration was warned by several former generals that there needed 
to be more troops in Iraq if we wanted to successfully seize and hold the area, but their comments fell on deaf ears 
(Tristam). Rumsfeld had to field feedback that said the US had still not deployed enough ground troops by March 
30, 2003. And, after the fall of Bagdad on April 9, the US continued to fight the insurgency rather than withdraw. 
On May 1st, Bush declared "major combat operations in Iraq have ended" thus officially ending the war (Tristam). 
Yet, the fighting carried on and American lives continued to be lost. Situations kept arising that "required" us to 
stay and deal with Iraq's problems, the largest of which being the al-Qaeda resurgence in response to the US 
invasion. During the Persian Gulf War, opportunities also arose after the first 100 hours for further intervention 
into Iraq, but we chose to leave because of a clear goal. In 2003, the "war on terror" was so adaptable to any 
action that the resurgence was fought rather than troops withdrawn. Al-Qaeda established a group in the region 
and began to impose "Taliban-like repression on Iraqis" in the places where they had overtaken (Tristam). 
Operation Desert Scorpion was launched on June 15, 2003 and marked the continuation of fighting that persists to 
this day.  
This lingering is a divergence from the last part of the Powell Doctrine: a clear exit strategy. Because we lack solid 
criteria for victory, there is no way to decide on an exit strategy, except to set arbitrary withdraw dates that 
correspond to no specific accomplishment in the region. The United States continues to play around with withdraw 
dates while adding to the laundry list of tasks to accomplish in Iraq, something that Colin Powell had always feared. 
Powell was heavily influenced by Fred Ikle's book Every War Must End wherein he writes that "fighting often 
continues long past the point where a 'rational' calculation would indicate that the war should be ended" (qtd in 
Powell 519).  
It is hard to understand why the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not conducted according to the clear and previously 
successful guidelines of the Powell Doctrine. One possible explanation is the fact that we now receive news media 
in almost real-time, which makes it harder to keep military plans opaque to the American people and to the rest of 
the world. This was already beginning to be a problem in Kuwait, and Powell himself admits "in this new media 
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environment we had to learn how to make the people understand and support what we were doing" (Powell 530). 
This problem is exacerbated by the current rapid expansion of technology, where most households have more 
televisions than people and the use of the internet is widespread. Information no longer takes days or even weeks 
to be circulated. Instead, the American public, and those around the world, are able to almost instantaneously to 
see and hear what is going on in conflict zones and with those in power. This leads to a hard-sell as far as conflict 
goes, particularly with the war in Iraq and the ever-shifting reasons given for going to war. American skepticism 
made it hard for President Bush to commit an overwhelming amount of troops, since the war was not largely 
supported and because he could not hide behind lagging media response. The confidence of the American people 
was rattled with the discovery of faulty intelligence information regarding weapons of mass destruction and media 
coverage of the lies certainly hurt the case for intervening in Iraq (Fisher). The international community was also 
able to watch the actions of the US government leading up to the invasion of Iraq, and subsequent military actions, 
and was as skeptical as the American public. The disapproval of the international community added to the opinions 
the Bush administration had to combat in order to deploy forces to Iraq, thus leading to an inability on the part of 
George Bush to muster an overwhelming military force. 
Potentially, Bush's personality itself played a role in the continuing intervention in Iraq. Operation Desert Storm is 
generally regarded as a success, and George W. Bush may have wanted to leave the presidency with an equally 
successful military operation to his name. There certainly has been talk of Bush carrying on the family legacy, 
though to what extent Bush's stubborn nature and ego played a role in the military strategy is hard to accurately 
estimate. Many Americans felt "his rationale for war was confused by poorly reasoned statements and claims of 
Iraqi programs that rested on nonexistent facts" which he used to continue the conflict rather than set criteria for 
victory and withdrawal (Fisher 391). 
Furthermore, the phrase "war on terror" is so ambiguous as to cover a range of military actions. There is no way to 
concretely measure the defeat of terror, and thus it is easy to continue fighting small battles in Iraq under the 
guise of fighting "terror." This has lead to the lingering effect of military intervention, wherein it is easy to 
continually find one more thing to do before withdrawal, rather than set a concrete deadline on conflict. Analyst 
David Fisher feels "Bush never tired of repeating that a link existed between Iraq and al-Qaeda" (Fisher 390). 
George Bush and his advisors could have set the toppling of Bagdad and the removal of Saddam from power as the 
deadline, and would have been able to end the attack on Iraq after a couple of weeks. Instead, we decided to 
address the resurgence of terrorist operations in the region, set-up an interim government and attempt to 
construct a new political society in the country. These tasks are very large and relatively hard to evaluate, and so 
the United States has become enmeshed in a murky campaign to fix Iraq that continues to this day.  
Finally, what is known is that Colin Powell left the position as Secretary of State after George W. Bush's first term in 
office, potentially in response to the administration's failure to adhere to Powell's personal military strategy. Many 
speculate that the decision was both a voluntary and involuntary decision. A Washington Post interview mused 
that "as secretary, he [Powell] was repeatedly outmaneuvered by the Pentagon and was never able to persuade 
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the administration to adopt that approach in Iraq, or to accept the State Department's plans for post-invasion 
occupation in Iraq." The article then went on to cite a government official who felt, ""the decision was made to 
keep Rumsfeld and drop Powell because if they would have kept Powell and let [the Rumsfeld team] go, that 
would have been tantamount to an acknowledgment of failure in Iraq and our policies there." Powell himself was 
privy to the decision making that lead to the strategy that was implemented in 2003 in stark contrast to Powell's 
traditional strategy. He may be able to further shed light on the reasons for this divergence, as his resignation 
shows his frustration with the Bush administration's unwillingness to use the Powell Doctrine the second time 
around, regardless of its previous efficacy. The strategy of the 2003 war in Iraq leaves us to question to what 
extent Colin Powell was coerced into representing a strategy that was against his better judgment due to the pro-
war sentiments of the administration. 
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The Powell Doctrine of Foreign Policy: International Development as Homeland 
Security 
  
Katherine Blaisdell 
  
Introduction 
  
Despite mixed response by voters to the idea of sending tax dollars to other countries for any purpose, 
administrations since Franklin Roosevelt have used foreign aid as part of their economic and foreign policy. The 
Bush administration and the Department of State under Colin Powell's leadership were no exception, and even 
raised foreign aid levels. However, many (see, for example, Mertus, 2008) argue that the Bush administration's 
primary goal was creating a strategic power balance and stable world system, with alleviation of poverty and 
disease being just a side effect to be used for public relations advantages. In his most recent public writings 
(coauthored with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and published in the Wall Street Journal), former 
Secretary of State Powell stated, "Our country's economic health and security are inextricably linked to the 
prosperity and security of the rest of the world" (2009). However, once this link is established, policymakers must 
assess how, and whether, foreign aid can contribute to that global prosperity and security. 
  
Both the idea of humanitarian aid and that of strategic economic assistance have proponents and skeptics, and 
there is a narrow school of people who believe that foreign aid in any form is a faulty proposition. Powell is a 
strong proponent of both forms of foreign aid; in announcing a seminal new foreign aid program, the Millennium 
Challenge Account, he called the MCA "a challenge to America to use our great power for good, and a challenge to 
developing nations to empower their people to build a better future." This statement is perhaps the foreign aid 
counterpart to the Powell Doctrine of military force: intervention for humanitarian reasons with overwhelming 
force that betters the US security position. This paper will make an effort to lay out enough information to assess 
this foreign aid doctrine, and to come to a conclusion about the efficacy and responsibility of Secretary Powell's 
foreign aid policy. 
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Context: The Purposes of Foreign Aid 
  
Since the speeches of Truman and Marshall announcing the Marshall plan after World War II and of Kennedy 
announcing the founding of both the Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps 
(Baltimore, n.d.), U.S. policymakers have drawn on humanitarian sentiments to draw support for foreign aid. 
Humanitarian-based aid claims solidarity with the recipients, and calls on the generosity and fellow-feeling of the 
populace. This argument draws upon the moral convictions of those being convinced to support the project, 
suggesting that it is the ethical imperative of rich, democratic nations to give sustenance and civil rights to the 
struggling inhabitants of third-world countries. The idea is often also connected to American exceptionalism, 
contending that the U.S. has a particular duty to bring its wealth and worldview to others. Lancaster and Van 
Dusen (2005), foreign policy professors at Georgetown University, argue that this motivation is most apparent 
when the receiving nation-state is both poor and lacking in any ready strategic position. However, disaster 
assistance - which made up more than $380 million of US foreign aid budgets in the early 2000s (USAID, 2002) - 
also fits into this category of humanitarian aid, as it is neither long term strategic development assistance nor likely 
to be directly tied to security. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance can have the benefit of solidifying diplomatic 
ties, while, it is hoped, eliminating suffering. 
  
On the other hand, international assistance can be a principally strategic part of foreign policy. Radelet (2003), a 
senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, notes that, although USAID was created in part to ensure that political 
and security-based projects were kept distinct and well separated from humanitarian aid and development 
assistance, that line blurred as the agency was asked to provide more and more aid in post-conflict zones, until 
finally Congress gave the State department formal control of the agency during the Clinton administration. A 1994 
Congressional Budget Office report, written about the same time, argued that foreign aid funding should be 
increased as a primary focus of security policy (Hanlon). This report provides a case for increasing the U.S. foreign 
aid budget from Cold War levels as a method of enhancing U.S. security. It lays out not only strategic arguments 
for foreign aid, but also ways to appropriate the money for that aid and how to allocate it, and assumes in 
analyzing the security benefits that other states will increase their input proportionately. However, the report also 
contends that foreign aid would accomplish some of the security goals of defense spending, going so far as to 
suggest that additional funds for foreign aid could be drawn from the Department of Defense budget. 
  
Such a report is most useful in noting that foreign aid decisions are often made - even by a Democratic Congress 
under a Democratic administration - for geostrategic (and economic) reasons, and that there are clear arguments 
for increasing foreign aid as a way to improve the security position of the U.S. For example, the author of the CBO 
report suggests that increased foreign aid is a much cheaper way for the U.S. to maintain its position in the world 
than the alternatives: broad-scale humanitarian disaster and/or conflict. He argues that present action is 
preferable to possible permanent damage. He also makes the case that a less impoverished world populace would 
be more likely to respect the international systems that keep peace; stability helps to embed the rule of law as a 
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global norm. Radelet (2003) also points to the strategy of paralleling military power with 'soft power', sending the 
message that the US has the capability to operate at all levels in the world system. 
  
There are also those commentators who argue that foreign aid is not effective policy in any case. These opinions 
range from World Bank analysts who contend that foreign aid moneys have been worse for developing countries 
than large oil reserves (Djankov, et al, 2005) to pundits who make it quite clear that foreign aid spending is 
wasteful, counterproductive, and even unconstitutional (Bonta, 2001). However, the most reasonable of these 
thinkers confine themselves to the contention that foreign aid has not worked well in particular cases thus far, and 
the more extreme ideologues (like Bonta) also tend to argue for such isolationism that foreign policy as a whole 
becomes moot, and so including them in a conversation about foreign policy decision making seems less than 
helpful. 
  
Distinction: The History of U.S. Foreign Aid and What Made Powell's Foreign Aid Policy Different 
  
The first seeds of U.S. foreign aid were planted during the Great Depression, when Franklin Roosevelt created the 
Economic Stabilization Fund to provide loans to stabilize foreign currencies as a way of creating greater world 
economic stability and a more favorable trade position for the U.S. (Bonta 2001, 28). Following World War II, 
Truman implemented America's best known foreign aid plan to ensure that post-war Europe would be a stable 
trading partner and diplomatic ally with the U.S. (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Kennedy would follow that plan 
with the creation of USAID to consolidate foreign aid programs, and from that time through the 1970s, aid was 
directed mostly to poor countries in need of either stabilization after conflict or capitalist development as a Cold 
War strategy (Baltimore, n.d.). The decades that followed were a time of precipitous decline in foreign aid in the 
wake of corruption scandals, and most aid made available during the 1980s primarily encouraged trade with 
growing U.S. transnational corporations and came with restrictions such as the Gag Rule, prohibiting aid from 
going to institutions that provided abortions or abortion counseling (Baltimore, n.d.). The Clinton administration 
placed a greater ideological emphasis on foreign aid, but spent much of that effort moving aid around and 
removing Reagan's restrictions. 
  
The foreign aid policy of the Bush administration might have been on track to look similar to that of Reagan's and 
G.H.W. Bush's, but September 11 provided the impetus to change both the goals of foreign aid and the way it was 
administered (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005). Both Lancaster and Van Dusen, in their analysis of the state of 
foreign aid (2005), and McArthur (a retired U.S. foreign service officer), in her report on President Bush's FY2003 
budget requests (2002), note that on the whole, foreign aid to Middle East states increased dramatically after 
2001. The latter article observes that Secretary Powell made no mention of the foreign aid amounts in presenting 
the plan to Congress, but instead spoke more broadly of foreign policy, including coupling aid for allies with "smart 
sanctions" of less friendly states. The following table briefly shows the change in foreign assistance levels from 
Clinton administration levels (1999-2001) to Bush administration levels (2002-2007). 
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Figure 1 Summary of Assistance to All Countries in millions, historical $US 
Program 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
USAID 7,419.8 5,907.2 6,451.1 8,419.1 10,125.
6 
11,207.
5 
10,052.
3 
9,610.2 11,940.
8 
Dept. of 
Agriculture 
3,085.2 1,941.4 2,070.9 1,433.1 2,625.4 2,150.5 2,317.7 2,033.0 1,835.4 
State 
Department
a 
1,516.7 2,486.0 1,857.1 2,340.3 2,184.0 4,026.3 5,037.2 5,374.5 5,656.7 
Dept. of 
Defense 
649.9 685.2 711.7 612.1 2,365.0 5,187.9 5,972.0 4,567.3 2,312.0 
MCC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 416.8 1,132.5 2,215.5 
Total 
Economicb 
14,677.
5 
12,702.
4 
12,896.
0 
15,226.
2 
19,308.
5 
27,481.
2 
28,167.
9 
26,884.
2 
28,915.
5 
Military 
Assistance 
3,913.8 4,876.4 3,941.8 4,797.1 6,661.6 6,145.6 7,330.7 12,260.
3 
13,024.
9 
  
 
Note: Adapted from US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook]. 
a State Department programs include the Global HIV/AIDS initiative and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR). Both programs fall under the "global gag rule," discussed below. 
b Total Economic Assistance is defined by Greenbook, and includes both MCC moneys and such funding as 
Department of Defense and State Department programs. 
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 The other region which received relatively high levels of aid during Powell's tenure as Secretary of State is Africa 
(Radelet, 2003). Smith (2004), a senior fellow at the Center for American Progess, notes, however, a number of 
interesting juxtapositions with the administration's stated goals of humanitarian assistance, two items in 
particular. On the causative end of aid, she points out that the administration has raised aid levels and opened 
diplomatic channels mostly with states that have begun exporting oil to the US. On the effect end, she notes that 
the administration coupled this aid - ostensibly for the fight against HIV/AIDS - with a reinstatement of the rule 
precluding aid from passing through organizations that provide abortion counseling. 
  
The core of Powell's foreign aid policy, however, was the brand new Millennium Challenge Account. Powell himself 
announced and commented on the MCA in a June, 2003, article in the Washington Post. In that piece, he 
explicates the humanitarian goal of ending poverty, while alluding to the security benefits for the US of such aid. 
He also notes that the $5 billion annual commitment (as yet unmet) would represent the largest increase in foreign 
aid since the implementation of the Marshall Plan under President Truman. The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, the organization created to manage the MCA, proclaims on its website that it "is based on the 
principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in 
people. MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth" 
(Millennium Challenge Corporation, "About MCC").  
  
The website also lays out the basic principles of the MCC's operations, the central point of which is that states 
must earn their aid by meeting certain qualifications. These indicators, shown in Figure 2, below are developed and 
measured by such organizations as the research arms of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and the 
UN's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Indicators").[1]  
  
Figure 2 
Millennium Challenge Corporation Selection Indicators 
Indicator Category Source 
Civil Liberties Ruling Justly Freedom House 
Political Rights Ruling Justly Freedom House 
Voice and Accountability Ruling Justly World Bank Institute 
Government Effectiveness Ruling Justly World Bank Institute 
Rule of Law Ruling Justly World Bank Institute 
Control of Corruption Ruling Justly World Bank Institute 
Immunization Rates Investing in People World Health Organization 
Public Expenditure on Health Investing in People World Health Organization 
Girls' Primary Education Completion Rate Investing in People UNESCO 
Public Expenditure on Primary Education Investing in People UNESCO and national sources 
Business Startup Economic Freedom IFC 
Inflation Economic Freedom IMF WEO 
Trade Policy Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation 
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Regulatory Quality Economic Freedom World Bank Institute 
Fiscal Policy Economic Freedom national sources, IMF WEO 
National Resource Management Investing in People CIESIN/Yale 
Land Rights and Access Economic Freedom IFAD/IFC 
Note: Adapted from Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Indicators" 
  
Each country has a 'scorecard' for these indicators, with graphs showing their change over the last several years, 
available to the public on its website. What most distinguishes MCC from USAID, which manages most of the US's 
foreign aid, is that its aid agreements are tied to finite, development-based contracts. Whereas AID may 
administer security-related aid and may fund the same programs in a given country for years at a time depending 
on the foreign policy goal of the project, MCC runs like a business, making deals with states to receive aid for a 
specific period of time and assuming progress in certain benchmarks. Such a system allows for strategic 
development assistance while maintaining the appearance, and perhaps functions, of openness and clear 
investment planning, highlighting these features as the focal strategy of Powell's foreign aid policy. 
  
Secretary Powell's decisions on foreign policy are best described in his own words. As he was preparing to leave 
office, he wrote a piece published in Foreign Policy magazine in early 2005. In the article, he continues the 
sentiments expressed in his 2003 Washington Post commentary, this time from the perspective of outgoing 
Secretary of State. He draws upon the political capital of a freshly elected George W. Bush and former president 
Kennedy, and lays out a series of arguments and strategies for foreign aid, including incentives for political allies; 
free market democracy; and policies to combat illegal transnational migration, disease, and black markets. This 
article is more detailed and academic than some of the work published during his time in office, but equally 
supportive of the foundations of Bush administration strategic aid policies. Furthermore, it presumes that, like 
much of the information on the MCA, the alternative to the problem of aid with no conditions is to attach strings 
to each piece of aid. 
  
Assessing Powell's Foreign Aid Policy: The Case of The Millennium Challenge Account 
  
Because the Millennium Challenge Account is the greatest change in foreign aid policy made under Secretary 
Powell, its programs make a functional case study for assessing that policy. The newness of the MCA means that 
there is still little literature published on the specific goals stated in implementing the policy, and the MCC website 
provides information that is detailed but self-affirming, emphasizing successes and highlighting data to support 
positive conclusions. However, an analysis can use a comparison between both the purposes of the MCA (as 
outlined by Secretary Powell) and the prospects for the MCC's structure and its results (as analyzed by 
development and public policy scholars) with current economic development indicators. 
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There were three basic purposes outlined by Colin Powell for the MCA at its inception. First, the creation of the 
MCA would both improve and supplement the system of foreign development assistance by implementing an aid 
system based on the principles of the free market. The second goal is to create incentives - again emphasizing the 
free market system - for greater civil rights and liberties, effective governance, human development, and 
"economic freedom". The third is the achievement of development goals, including stable economies, 
health/disease alleviation, (limited) environmental protection, and poverty reduction (Powell, 2003). These 
purposes are broad, but perhaps achievable in the long term. 
  
The first purpose, the bolstering of the US foreign aid system, seems the most achievable. In his Foreign Policy 
article, Powell (2005) described the new relationship between foreign aid agencies under his control as one of 
complimentary efforts, with "USAID pushing from one end and MCA pulling from the other." Whereas USAID has 
served, in the last two decades at least, as an agency serving the particular foreign policy goals of each 
administration, the MCC is structured to be independent and serve only development purposes, although its 
governing board is still chaired by the Secretary of State, and its Chief Executive Officer appointed by the 
President. Furthermore, USAID operates on an inherently political basis, doling out aid for emergency 
humanitarian or long term strategic purposes, but the MCA is designed to be a competitive process.  
  
This feature would serve as an answer to critics of foreign aid policy (such as Radelet, 2003) who argue that it is too 
often corrupted from the outset by legislative earmarks and corrupted in its production by going through 
dictatorial or unstable governments. However, there seems to be no clear mechanism in place for preventing 
Congress from targeting their constituencies when budgeting for the MCA, rather than allowing countries' 
proposals to guide appropriation of funds. Radelet (2003) points out that allowing earmarks into the process to the 
extent that they are present in other foreign aid budgets would severely undermine both the legitimacy and the 
efficacy of the MCA. Furthermore, although the country selection process is designed to be open and based on 
performance indicators, there is room for choice to be made among nearly-equal countries. 
  
The incentives system, the second purpose of the MCA, makes a great deal of sense from the perspective of free 
market economics. It creates a fairly basic trade for very poor states: accomplish certain things for your people and 
your economic system, and gain more money to put into your people and your economic system. As Powell points 
out, USAID is still available to "push" states which lack the financial wherewithal for even that simple tradeoff. The 
immense complexity of measuring countries' performance along the indicators makes determining who will gain 
the incentives challenging. Radelet (2003) points out the particular difficulty of determining what to do with states 
that meet the qualifications in time to sign compacts but then slip during the contracted term. There is room in the 
MCC's operations to adjust indicators, which will be helpful in keeping them relevant, but also opens the system up 
to potential biases or loss of rigor in the selection process. 
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Incentivizing those standards has had mixed results. The MCC's status reports (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
2009) show the total funding for the country and highlight bright spots in the results of agreements, but they give 
no details on the particular program budgets or the wider budgets of recipient governments. The result is that the 
fungibility of these funds is invisible and difficult to assess (Radelet, 2003), meaning that with aid input from the 
U.S., countries are able to shift their own moneys to unrelated and potentially corrupt purposes with no 
mechanism for redress by the MCC. Furthermore, basing an aid system on the free market system and 
incentivizing protections of a free market presume that this kind of capitalism is the most useful and beneficial to 
developing economies. However, Chua (2004), an international business law professor at Yale Law School, points 
out that exporting American-variety free market democracy in the way one might export silicone chips or debt 
packages can have dire consequences for the receiving country. While this is a minority opinion in the literature, it 
is a worthy criticism to note given that free market ideology is a central focus of the MCA. 
  
Development goals, however, are the most obvious purpose for foreign assistance and of the MCA in particular, 
and also in some ways the easiest to measure. The first of these broad goals, as outlined by Powell (2005), is 
health, especially in terms of disease reduction. He spends particular time emphasizing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
which is notable in part because so much of his other foreign aid policy was directed at increasing aid to Africa, 
ostensibly to help with HIV/AIDS. The restriction known as the global gag rule, preventing aid of any kind from 
going through organizations that do any work related to abortion, reinstated by the latter President Bush, has 
been a countervailing force to much of the funds directed toward the AIDS pandemic. Ghana, which according the 
MCC became eligible for MCA funding and began receiving MCA funds in 2007, demonstrates this trend. The 2008 
UNAIDS report indicates that Ghana, which according to the MCC increased health expenditures to meet MCC 
guidelines, has experienced a rise in AIDS prevalence since 2005. Lesotho, which just began receiving 'threshold' 
funds[2] at the end of 2008 according to the MCC, has experienced the same phenomenon. 
  
Numbers on hunger, an indicator that demonstrates both poor health and poverty, are mixed. Madagascar is in its 
third year of compact implementation with the MCA, but according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 
2008), the prevalence of malnutrition in Madagascar has risen to 37%. Access to clean water, which is tied to both 
community development and the prevention of disease, is at only 65% in Benin, which has been receiving MCA 
compact funds since 2006. That means that one-third of the population of Benin has no improved water source, 
and MCA funds have been primarily focused on economic projects (MCC). Zambia, too, has been receiving 
threshold funds since 2006, but only 58% of its citizens have access to improved water sources, and its threshold 
program is focused on improving border management (MCC). Although these programs are all somewhat new, it is 
curious to note that moneys are going to programs that do not seem to be addressing their worst health problems. 
  
Environmental protection, though less emphasized by development economists, is one of the features of progress 
noted by Powell. He particularly noted his work on forest conservation efforts in the 2005 article, for reasons of 
both environmental stewardship and human livelihood. However, only four countries of all those receiving aid 
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from the MCA did not engage in deforestation in the years leading up to that article[3]. However, the only related 
criterion for MCA assistance, "Resource Management," is an average of access to improved water and sanitation, 
child mortality, and proportion of protected eco-regions (SEDAC, 2009). 
  
The final category, poverty alleviation, is the most difficult to quantify, because steady economic development 
takes time to demonstrate. Of note, however, is the fact that all of the MCC's countries have experienced modest 
or significant per capita income increases over the last ten years (World Bank, 2009). In a few cases, for countries 
like Honduras and Tanzania that have been receiving MCA money for several years, this growth in income might be 
partly explained by MCA programs, which would point to success. However, very few of the chosen countries were 
not already on the rise when they began MCC threshold agreements or compacts. From one perspective, this 
information is a positive sign that the MCC chose countries where its programs were likely to be successful. From 
another, however, it seems that the MCC chose countries where its money would look like it was making a 
dramatic impact, either so that its global reputation would be solid or so that it could continue to garner funding 
increases from Congress. 
  
As a whole, the Millennium Challenge Account is effective at what it has set out to do in the short term. As a set of 
particular policy goals in Secretary Powell's overall policy doctrine, it is more or less functional: in terms of 
following a given set of criteria and encouraging free market democracy (a theme, if not an explicit goal, in Powell's 
writings), the MCC does what it is supposed to do. Apart from stated goals and measurable development 
indicators, the success expected from the MCA is demonstrated by the fact that, as President Bush has left office, 
the new administration, which, in the range of mainstream foreign policy is the opposite of the Bush 
administration, has taken complete ownership of the MCA. As of early March, the front page of the MCC's website 
read, "Achieving Obama's pledge; advancing Clinton's vision." Nowhere mentioned on the main pages are 
Secretary Powell or the Bush administration, who created the MCA. 
  
Conclusions 
  
Secretary Powell's vision for foreign aid works well in the context of his world view. It embodies true 
compassionate conservatism, emphasizing the power the US has to make poorer countries over in its own likeness 
and maintaining a power structure in which the US continues to be able to use its military and financial might to 
end suffering. Like the Powell Doctrine for military force, this ideology has some clear strategic advantages, not 
least of which is its congruity with the sense that the US has both a sound moral vision for the world and the 
means to create that vision. However, there are some pragmatic difficulties with such a foreign policy, and foreign 
aid cannot hope to accomplish the goal of poverty elimination or universal health without support from other 
aspects of foreign policy. 
  
25
Editors: Full Issue
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2014
Katherine Blaisdell 
24   e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010) 
One of the most striking ways in which foreign aid is insufficient to these problems is the way in which it must 
compete with the other economic policies of the US. Radelet (2003, p. 160) makes this point quite succinctly in his 
assessment of the MCA: "If the United States is serious about helping low-income nations establish a base for 
robust private-sector activities, sustained economic growth, and poverty reduction, it must rethink some of its 
other policies affecting these nations." Basically, the US bases its foreign aid policy around the idea of promoting 
development through open competition and free markets, but bases all of its other economic policies on 
maintaining a superior economic position in the world, and these forces are competing with each other, and not 
very freely at that.  
  
For example, the US's own agricultural subsidies put it fairly low on its own assessment of economic freedom. 
Radelet makes note of a 2002 Oxfam report on cotton subsidies. It points out that Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali all 
lose more than 1% of GDP annually due to US cotton subsidies. All three of those states are supported by the MCA; 
two are in the process of receiving and implementing compact funds, and the third has completed a threshold 
agreement and is now eligible for compact funds. However, the total assistance invested by the MCA is less, 
according to the Oxfam (2002) report than those countries lose annually due to cotton subsidies. That fact means 
that, if the US were to stop subsidizing its cotton farmers (none of which recipients are below the poverty line), it 
could stop sending money to West Africa entirely and those countries would still be better off. Foreign aid cannot 
function in the face of these kind of subsidies. The Secretary of State does not control domestic agriculture policy, 
and he or she does not even have total control of US foreign policy,[4] but shaping foreign aid policy that is 
counteracted by other policy is a waste of time and energy, not to mention taxpayer dollars. 
  
Trade agreements do fall, at least in part, under the purview of the Secretary of State, and they are also often 
deeply destructive to foreign economies. One example is the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 
made between the US and six states in Central America. Writing on her experiences in Nicaragua, Wahlberg notes: 
  
While agriculture contributes only 2% to the GDP of the US, it contributes 17% to the GDP of Central 
America on average, and in Nicaragua it represents 32%. Moreover 36% of the labor force in Central 
America is employed in agricultural activities, whereas the agricultural sector in the US employs only 2% 
of the labor force. Finally the US is Central America's most important trading partner, about 40-50% of 
Central American exports go to the US. Meanwhile, Central America accounts for only about 1% of total 
US trade. 
  
An economist will say that trades do not occur when they do not benefit both parties, but such a vastly unequal 
relationship means that there is immense pressure for the small Central American signatories to accede to the 
preferences of the US, even if such a decision means that their long term interests are not benefited. The result is 
that, as with subsidies, foreign aid programs designed to promote free enterprise are hindered by trade 
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agreements that dampen them. In short, trade agreements provide another means by which well-crafted, well-
intentioned foreign aid policy can be expected to fail. 
  
All this might provoke the response that foreign aid should be abandoned entirely, and the resources used 
elsewhere. Once in San Francisco, during a discussion about the value of foreign aid, a conservative judge asked 
me, "Did Truman get us in too deep in foreign aid with the Marshall Plan? I mean, what do you say to the guy 
sleeping on the street down in the Tenderloin when he asks you for a dollar, and you say, 'Sorry, I already sent my 
dollar to Darfur'?" However, I think that, given Colin Powell's stance on Darfur and other conflicts, he would 
disagree with that conclusion as fiercely as I do. The problem, rather, is that foreign aid needs to be thought of and 
implemented as one aspect of a coherent foreign policy and not just a public relations expediency. Powell wrote in 
2005, "Humanitarian assistance is a stop-gap measure." If foreign aid is done right, humanitarian assistance will 
never again be necessary except in the case of disaster.  
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[1] The use of a discrete list of indicators developed and measured by third parties is an effort, according to the 
MCC, to make sure the selection process is transparent. However, the use of this particular set of indicators, 
emphasizing economic and political rather than human development, may confirm Mertus' (2003) argument that 
human rights norms are still not deeply embedded in U.S. foreign policy. 
[2] The MCC has two categories of agreements with recipient countries. Compacts, which are normally signed for 
three- to five-year terms, are for states that have qualified fully. Threshold grants are made to states in the process 
of making improvements to become eligible for compacts. 
[3] The World Bank's World Development Indicators (2007) lists net deforestation from 1990 to 2005. The only 
countries on the MCC's Countries list showing a negative number, indicating a net increase in forested area, are 
Kyrgyz, Moldova, Morocco, and Rwanda. 
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[4] The Washington Post article discussing the announcement of Powell's resignation as Secretary of State suggests 
that this lack of ability to shape foreign policy in the face of far-right conservatives in the administration is one of 
the reasons he resigned. See Allen (2004). 
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This paper will address evidence linking the former Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, to the hotly-debated 
torture program of the George W. Bush (GWB) administration. The evidence in this paper suggests that the policies 
and practices of torture in the War on Terror were planned and authorized by General Powell and other senior 
officials in the GWB administration. 
To be sure, the senior officials of the GWB administration uniformly reject allegations of torture. President Bush 
has repeatedly denied torture allegations, for instance, once claiming that "The United States does not torture. It's 
against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not authorized it - and I will not authorize it."[1] However, these 
claims have been contradicted by recently published reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and ABC News. Senior GWB administration officials authorized interrogation methods that a majority of Americans 
consider to constitute torture.[2] General Powell and other senior GWB administration officials have used the term 
"enhanced interrogation techniques" to describe submersion in water to the point of drowning, sleep deprivation, 
forcibly-prolonged standing, slapping, and confinement in boxes among other techniques. They have also used the 
term "combined interrogation techniques" to described the use of several "enhanced" methods in combination. 
Ultimately, the debate on the torture program of the George W. Bush Administration, and General Powell's role 
therein, rests on questions of law. 
The legal opinions at issue originate from the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel. The opinions were 
authored by attorney John Yoo, who is currently under investigation for professional misconduct and faulty legal 
reasoning.[3] The torture program of the GWB administration was justified by at least two of Yoo's opinions on the 
methods that could be used in interrogations, both of which have been repudiated and withdrawn. The first memo 
in question was dated August 1, 2002, and it defined torture as "only extreme acts" causing pain similar in intensity 
to that caused by death or organ failure.[4] The memo stated that for "alternative procedures" to be considered 
torture, and thus illegal, they would have to cause pain of the sort "that would be associated with serious physical 
injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will 
result."[5] The second legal memo in question was dated March 14, 2003, and it defined such practices as 
acceptable "so long as military interrogators did not specifically intend to torture their captives."[6] The legal 
justification for the torture program of the George W. Bush Administration is questionable, at best.  
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Evidence has recently surfaced to suggest that General Powell participated in high-level discussions of the George 
W. Bush administration torture program as a member of the National Security Council Principals Committee. This 
evidence surfaced in reports from ABC News in 2008 and 2009, and the reports indicate that General Powell 
attended hundreds of meetings during his term as Secretary of State between 2001 and 2005. The members of the 
committee included other high-level George W. Bush Administration officials such as Vice President Cheney, 
former National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, General Powell and 
other officials authorized CIA torture sessions on high-value detainees that "pushed the limits of international 
law," as well as those authorized by the Justice Department.[7] These reports have been corroborated by other 
reports originating from the International Committee of the Red Cross.[8]  
The ABC News reports on the NSC Principals Committee suggested that its members "not only discussed specific 
plans and specific interrogation methods, but approved them."[9] Senior GWB Administration officials authorized 
"specific details of how high-value al Qaeda suspects would be interrogated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency."[10] An ABC News report characterized NSC Principals Committee discussions on "enhanced interrogation 
techniques" as "almost choreographed - down to the number of times CIA agents could use specific tactics."[11] 
Another report suggests that "CIA officers would demonstrate some of the tactics" to the members of the 
Principals Committee[12] The Principals Committee was thus deeply involved in the authorization and 
implementation of the torture program.  
The NSC Principals Committee was also involved with a global network of secret Central Intelligence Agency 
prisons. A 2009 report by the International Committee of the Red Cross exposed the specifics of this involvement. 
The Red Cross report detailed the stories of prisoners and details of "suffocation by water, "prolonged stress 
standing," "beatings by use of a collar," "confinement in a box" and other methods.[13] The Red Cross report 
concluded: "The allegations of ill treatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the ill treatment, either 
singly or in combination, constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."[14] In every case, General Powell 
and the other members of the NSC Principals Committee approved these "extremely specific" measures 
unanimously.[15]  
General Powell was in present at the National Security Council Principals Committee when it authorized the 
"Golden Shield" for Central Intelligence Agency interrogators. The "Golden Shield" legal opinion from the attorney 
John Yoo in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department justified the most extreme methods used at the 
Central Intelligence Agency "black sites." The "Golden Shield" memo claimed that "certain acts may be cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to [constitute]... 
torture."[16] The Principals Committee unanimously approved the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" on 
high-value suspects. They also authorized "combined interrogation techniques" for recalcitrant suspects. Although 
the "Golden Shield" legal opinion that protected CIA interrogators was withdrawn, General Powell and the other 
members of the NSC Principals Committee continued to authorize torture. [17]  
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General Powell has commented through an aide that there were "hundreds of [Principals] meetings" but that he 
was "not at liberty to discuss private meetings."[18] And although General Powell has denied discussing torture 
with the other members of the NSC Principal's Committee, he has admitted to having participated in discussions 
about the "methods that could be used to extract information."[19] Otherwise, General Powell has repeatedly 
declined to comment on the ABC News reports on the interrogation program or private discussions in Principals 
Committee meetings. The evidence currently available suggests that General Powell, as a member of the NSA 
Principals Committee, has had a part in authorizing the most extreme interrogation methods used by Americans in 
the War on Terror.  
While General Powell played an instrumental role in the development and authorization of the torture program of 
the George W. Bush administration, other evidence suggests that he may also have been a voice of dissent inside 
the administration. This understanding is informed by a classified memo leaked to the press that revealed a debate 
inside the GWB administration regarding the applicability of the Geneva Convention to suspected terrorists.  
On January 25, 2002, General Powell reportedly "hit the roof" when he received a inaccurate and factually 
erroneous memo that White House counsel Alberto Gonzales had written to President Bush. General Powell and 
other State Department officials were "horrified," according to Newsweek.[20] The Gonzales memo assumed a 
radical conception of presidential authority and was pointedly against the application of the Geneva Convention to 
detainees from Afghanistan. Gonzales argued in the memo that the United States did not need to apply the 
Geneva Convention to prisoners from Afghanistan because it was a "failed state" that was "not capable of fulfilling 
its international obligations."[21] It argued that the imperatives of the War on Terrorism "render obsolete 
Geneva's strict limitations on questioning enemy prisoners."[22] Further, Gonzales argued that by applying the 
Geneva Convention to al Qaeda and the Taliban, the "U.S. will continue to be constrained" by its treaty obligations, 
military regulations, and international law.[23]  
This resulted in an impassioned January 26 counter-memo that General Powell sent to the White House decried 
the legal reasoning and strategic implications of Gonzales' legal arguments. It took the form of a formal request to 
the GWB Administration asking that it reconsider its position on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to 
Afghanistan.[24] His request raised salient objections to the Gonzales memo and offered an improved briefing for 
President Bush on the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the conflict in Afghanistan. In the request, General 
Powell strongly urged Gonzales to "restructure the [Gonzales] memorandum" to "give the President a much 
clearer understanding of the options available to him and their consequences."[25] General Powell encouraged 
Gonzales to "make clear the President's choice[s]," commenting that the memo from White House counsel Alberto 
Gonzales "[did] not squarely present the President the options that are available to him."[26]  
General Powell argued in the January 26 counter-memo that the Gonzales memo was "inaccurate or incomplete in 
several respects," citing "important factual errors."[27] He commented that the Gonzales recommendation was 
"contrary to the official U.S. government position" and that it might be construed as hypocritical to label 
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Afghanistan a "failed state" given that "the United States and international community have consistently held 
Afghanistan to its treaty obligations and identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions."[28] General Powell 
also argued that nature of conflict between the U.S. military and non-state actors does not "render obsolete" the 
Geneva Convention because the "[Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War] was 
intended to cover all types of armed conflict and did not by its terms limit its application."[29] Finally, General 
Powell pointed out that it would be redundant to claim that the "U.S. will continue to be constrained" by its treaty 
obligations and international law because the United States complies with "universally recognized standards."[30] 
General Powell believed that the Gonzales legal arguments were misleading to President Bush and that they could 
threaten American interests if discovered. The tone of General Powell's response imply that he believed that the 
standards of the Geneva Conventions should be deemed inviolable, even if Afghanistan was a "failed state." 
General Powell clarified two options for President Bush: 
Option 1: the Geneva Convention on the treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) does not apply to the conflict on 
"failed State" or some other grounds. Announce this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the 
principles of the GPW [Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War]; 
and 
Option 2: Determine that the Geneva Convention does apply to the conflict in Afghanistan, but that members of al 
Qaeda as a group and the Taliban individually or as a group are not entitled to Prisoner of War status under the 
Convention. Announce this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the principles of the GPW [Geneva 
Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War]. 
The strongest evidence to contradict the assertion that General Powell supported the GWB administration torture 
program is implicit in the two options he proposed for President Bush. General Powell pointedly included in both 
options the imperative that the United States "treat all detainees consistent with the principles of the GPW 
[Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War]." [31] Neither option allows for torture. 
General Powell then elaborated upon the benefits and costs of each option in a detailed summary. While he 
admitted that Option 1 provided "maximum flexibility," he pointed out that it would "reverse over a century of 
U.S... support [for] the Geneva Convention," and "undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops."[32] 
He clearly preferred Option 2. However, over the objections of General Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other officials in the GWB Administration successfully persuaded President Bush to refuse 
'Prisoner-of-War' status to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees from Afghanistan.[33]  
The evidence currently available seems contradictory. On one hand, General Powell was an early voice of dissent in 
the George W. Bush administration, authoring an impassioned counter-argument to the first of the "torture 
memos" that he received from White House counsel Alberto Gonzales on January 25, 2002. On the other hand, 
General Powell's voice of dissent afterwards faded into the chorus of the National Security Council Principals 
Committee, which unanimously authorized torture in secret Central Intelligence Agency prisons across the world. 
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Efforts to understand General Powell's apparently shifting position on torture become further complicated by 
other evidence. 
A 2004 report on the prison abuses at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison has connected General Powell to a 
questionable CIA practice associated with the internment of "ghost detainees" in foreign prisons.[34] The term 
"ghost detainee" was used by the George W. Bush Administration to describe persons in U.S. custody whose 
identity has been kept hidden by obfuscating their true names to keep their detention anonymous and secret. 
Many "ghost detainees" were proven to be innocent.[35] The Washington Post has reported that "ghost detainees 
were regularly locked in isolation cells on Tier 1A [of Abu Ghraib] and that they were kept from international 
human rights organizations." [36] U.S. Army Major General Antonio Taguba wrote in an official report that this 
practice was "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine, and in violation of international law."[37] 
This illegal practice was orchestrated by top U.S. military commanders and CIA agents. At least one of these orders 
came from the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, who illegally ordered military guards to 
hide a prisoners from Red Cross inspectors and to remove his name from official rosters.[38] This cooperation 
between the Army and the CIA culminated in an arrangement between top military intelligence officials at the Abu 
Ghraib prison and the Central Intelligence Agency "to hide certain detainees at the facility without officially 
registering them" in violation of international law.[39] This established link between Central Intelligence Agency 
agents and top military officials raise questions about General Powell's involvement with the a search for three 
innocent "Ghost detainees" in the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. 
The evidence suggests that General Powell was aware of this illegal arrangement between the U.S. Army and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. General Powell, acting as Secretary of State, was involved in a search for three falsely-
imprisoned Saudi medical personnel at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. It seems that CIA officers interned 
three Saudi medical personnel who had been working for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The CIA 
officers placed them with false names in Abu Ghraib, preventing several attempts to locate them. A Saudi General, 
the commanding officer of the falsely imprisoned men, failed to locate them because their names were not in the 
official prisoner registry database. The US Embassy in Riyadh likewise failed to locate the prisoners. However, 
"shortly after the search for the Secretary of State [General Powell], a JIDC [Joint Interrogation and Detention 
Center] official recalled that CIA officers once brought three men together into the facility" and they were soon 
released.[40] A former aide to General Powell has also argued that the Central Intelligence Agency regularly held 
innocent detainees in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay "in hopes they could provide information for a mosaic of 
intelligence."[41]  
From the evidence that can currently be brought to bear on this issue there emerges a picture of contentious 
debate on the issue of torture within the GWB administration. Reliable reports reveal an unexplained shift in 
General Powell's position on torture during his tenure as Secretary of State. This shift saw General Powell rejecting 
torture in an impassioned memo in January 2002 but later authorizing torture repeatedly as a member of the 
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National Security Council. These reports also highlight connections between General Powell and the CIA torture 
program from its inception in Afghanistan, implementation in the global network of secret prisons administered by 
the Central Intelligence Agency, in Guantanamo Bay, and finally in the scandal at Abu Ghraib. 
A caveat must be added to this discussion of evidence. There exists a possibility that the evidence used in this 
investigation was leaked to the press by General Powell himself. This would not be unprecedented. Some have 
suggested that General Powell used his public popularity to advance his own agenda in the news.[42] New York 
Times columnist William Saffire has noted that General Powell "doesn't zip his lip as well as a team player does 
when he loses."[43] Additionally, a New York Times editorial remarked that "everyone in Washington" assumed 
that General Powell was Bob Woodward's key source for Bush's War.[44] In another example, three days after he 
"hit the roof" after reading the January 25, 2002 memo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Gonzales 
memo was leaked to the Washington Post. It is impossible to be sure if the evidence currently available informs an 
accurate understanding of General Powell's role in the torture program of the GWB administration. 
It remains unclear what his motivations and aims were-if he believed that using torture in the War on Terror would 
promote American interests or if he was striving to bring moderation to the GWB administration. Crucial evidence 
remains classified. 
Bibliography 
Clifford, Alexander. "Colin Powell's Promotion: The Real Story." New York Times, December 23, 1997, pg. A19. 
Knowlton, Brian. "Former Powell Aide Says Bush Policy Is Run by 'Cabal'." New York Times, October 21, 2005, pg. 
A15. 
Dowd, Maureen. "Colin Powell Rules!" New York Times,September 17, 1995, pg. E15. 
________. "Powell Without Picasso." New York Times ,February 5, 2003, pg. A27. 
Danner, Mark. "A Doctrine Left Behind." New York Times,November 21, 2004, pg. WK13. 
Echholm, Erik. "In a Hint of Progress, State News Media Cite Powell's 'Sorry'." New York Times, April 11, 2001, pg. 
A12. 
Erlanger, Steven. "The Secretary of State." New York Times, December 18, 2000, pg. A20. 
Friedman, Thomas L. "Policy by Obituary." New York Times, July 10, 2001, pg. A19. 
________. "Colin Powell's Eyebrows." New York Times, November 10, 2002, pg. C13. 
36
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/e-Research/vol1/iss1/1
  Colin Powell, Torture and Terror 
e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010)   35 
Gelb, Leslie H. "Gen. Powell's Lament." New York Times, May 5, 1991, pg. E17. 
________. "Vance and Powell," New York Time.," January 10, 1993, pg. E23. 
Gordon, Michael R. "Beltway Warrior." New York Times, August 27, 1995, pg. SM40. 
Greenfield, Jeff. "Seizing the Middle Ground." New York Times, October 9, 1995, pg. A17. 
Guinier, Lani. "Credit Bush Doesn't Deserve." New York Times, August 8, 2000, pg. A27. 
Halloran, Richard. "Cast of the Reluctant General." New York Times, October 5, 1987, pg. A18. 
Herbert, Bob. "If Colin Powell Runs." New York Times, September 22, 1995, pg. A31. 
________. "Powell, Then and Now." New York Times,September 27, 2004, pg. A27. 
________. "Bush's Echo Chamber." New York Times, November 19, 2004, pg. A27. 
Horowitz, Mark. "Laugh Riot in Los Angeles: Colin Powell co-conspirator?" New York Times,May 16, 1992, pg. 23. 
Ingraham, Laura. "Powell is Bad for the G.O.P." New York Times, September 20, 1995, pg. A21. 
Isaacson, Walter. "Colin Powell's Redeeming Failures." New York Times, November 16, 2004, pg. A27. 
Keller, Bill. "The World According to Powell." New York Times,November 25, 2001, pg. SM60. 
Keller, Bill. "Why Colin Powell Should Go." New York Times,March 22, 2003, pg. A11. 
Lewis, Anthony. "Powell Was Right." New York Times,May 3, 1991, pg. A31. 
________. "The Powell Factor." New York Times,June 14, 1993, pg. A15. 
________. "To Thine Own Self Be True." New York Times, October 23, 1995, pg. A15. 
________. "General Powell's Chance." New York Times, September 25, 1995, pg. A15. 
Lewis, Charles. "Colin Powell.'s Critique: Part II." New York Times, August 3, 2000, pg. A33. 
Lind, Michael. "The radical center of the moderate middle?" New York Times, December 3, 1995, pg. SM72. 
Luttwak, Edward. "Governing Against Type." New York Times,November 28, 2004, pg. WK11. 
37
Editors: Full Issue
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2014
Jonathan Cohen 
36   e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010) 
Noonan, Peggy. "The Aftergloom of Colin Powell." New York Times, November 12, 1995, pg. E15. 
Perlez, Jane. "A Test Ahead for Powell (and His Doctrine)." New York Times, December 17, 2000, pg. WK5. 
________. "Plan to Modify U.N. Sanctions Against Iraq Bogs Down, Powell Says." New York Times, June 30, 2001, 
pg. A3. 
________. "Powell Finds Setting Timetable for Mideast Peace Confounding." New York Times, July 1, 2001, pg. 8. 
Powell, Colin L. U.S. foreign policy in a time of transition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, 1988). 
________. American foreign policy: opportunities and challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, 1988). 
________. "Is the future what it used to be?" Alfred M Landon lectures on public issues (Manhattan, Kansas: 
Kansas State University, 1990). 
________.My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995). 
________. "No Country Left Behind," Foreign Policy, No. 146 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 28-35. 
________. A soldier's way: an autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1995). 
________. (edited by Lisa Shaw). In his own words: Colin Powell (New York: Berkeley Publishing Group, 1995). 
________. (and Truman, Harry S.) President Truman and the desegregation of the armed forces: A 50th anniversary 
view of Executive Order 9981 (Washington, D.C.: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1998). 
Purdum, Todd S. "Imagining How Powell Might Still Have a Job." New York Times, November 21, 2004, pg. WK4. 
Rubin, James P. "Powell's Complex Record." New York Times, January 17, 2001, pg. A23. 
Rosenthal, A.M. "A Gift From Powell." New York Times, September 19, 1995, pg. A21. 
Safire, William. "Colin Powell Dissents." New York Times, January 28, 2002, pg. A15. 
________. "Colin in the Cross-Fire." New York Times, April 28, 2004, pg. A21. 
Toners, Robin. "A Colin Powell Warning on Race Hatred." New York Times, May 15, 1994, pg. 28. 
38
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/e-Research/vol1/iss1/1
  Colin Powell, Torture and Terror 
e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010)   37 
No Author. "The Powell Shake-Up." New York Times,October 31, 1995, pg. A26. 
No Author. "Colin Powell's Calypso Tour." New York Times,April 26, 1998, pg. SM19. 
No Author. "Remarks at Announcement of Powell's Nomination as Secretary of State." New York Times, December 
17, 2000, pg. 51. 
No Author. "General Powell in the Middle East." New York Times,February 28, 2001, pg. A18. 
No Author. "The Powell Mission." New York Times, April 15, 2002, pg. A22. 
No Author. "D-Day for Colin Powell." New York Times, July 28, 2002, pg. C12. 
No Author. "Which Powell is Which?" New York Times, April 20, 2004, pg. A18. 
No Author. "The Cabinet Shuffle- Good Soldier Powell." New York Times, November 16, 2004, pg. A26. 
 
 
 
[1] N.A. "US does not torture, Bush insists," BBC, November 7, 2005. 
[2] N.A. "Poll Results: Waterboarding is torture," CNN, November 6, 2007. 
[3] Michael Isikoff, "A Torture Report Could Spell Big Trouble For Bush Lawyers," Newsweek, February 14, 2009. 
[4] Lara Jakes, "Cheney, Others, OK'd Harsh Interrogations," ABC News, April 11, 2009. 
[5] Mark Danner. "Tales from Torture's Dark World," New York Times, March 15, 2009. 
[6] Lara Jakes, "Cheney, Others, OK'd Harsh Interrogations," ABC News, April 11, 2009. 
[7] N.A. "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced Interrogation," ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
[8] Danner, Mark, "Tales from Torture's Dark World," New York Times, March 15, 2009. 
[9] Jan Crawford, Howard L. Rosenberg and Ariane de Vogue. "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced 
Interrogation," ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
39
Editors: Full Issue
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2014
Jonathan Cohen 
38   e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010) 
[10] Jan Crawford Greenburg, Howard L Rosenberg, and Ariana de Vogue, "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 
'Enhanced Interrogation,' ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
[11] Ibid. 
[12] Lara Jakes, "Cheney, Others, OK'd Harsh Interrogations," ABC News, April 11, 2009. 
[13] Mark Danner. "Tales from Torture's Dark World," New York Times, March 15, 2009. 
[14] Ibid. 
[15] Jan Crawford, Howard L. Rosenberg and Ariane de Vogue. "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced 
Interrogation," ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
[16] Alberto R. Gonzales. "Standards for Conduct Under Interrogation," in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. 
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 172, 
[17] Jan Crawford, Howard L. Rosenberg and Ariane de Vogue. "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced 
Interrogation," ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
[18] Jan Crawford, Howard L. Rosenberg and Ariane de Vogue. "Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced 
Interrogation," ABC News, April 9, 2008. 
[19] Colin Powell, interview by author, Chapman University, Orange, CA, March 28, 2009. 
[20] John Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff, "The Roots of Torture," Newsweek, May 24, 2004. 
[21] Alberto Gonzales. "Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflic t with 
al Qaeda and the Taliban," in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 118-122. 
[22] Ibid. 
[23] Ibid. 
[24] The request was dated January 26, 2002, and titled: "Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the 
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan." 
[25] Ibid, 124. 
40
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/e-Research/vol1/iss1/1
  Colin Powell, Torture and Terror 
e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010)   39 
[26] Colin Powell. "Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan," in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 122-125. 
[27] Ibid. 
[28] Ibid. 
[29] Ibid. 
[30] Ibid. 
[31] Colin Powell. "Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan," in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 122-126. 
[33] Colin Powell. "Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan," in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 122-126. 
[34] MG George R Fay. "Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade," 
in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1057. 
[35] Souad Mekhennet and Craig S. Smith, "German Spy Agency Admits Mishandling Abduction Case," New York 
Times, June 2, 2006. 
[36] Josh White, "Army, CIA Agreed on 'Ghost' Prisoners," Washington Post, March 11, 2005. 
[37] "Edward T. Pound, "Hiding a bad guy named Triple X," U.S. News and World Report, June 13, 2004. 
[38] Ibid. 
[39] Josh White, "Army, CIA Agreed on 'Ghost' Prisoners," Washington Post, March 11, 2005. 
[40]MG George R Fay. "Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade," 
in The Torture Papers, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1056. 
[41] Andrew O Selsky, "Ex-Bush admin official: Many at Gitmo are innocent," Associated Press, March 20, 2009. 
[42] William Safire. "Colin in the Cross-Fire," New York Times, April 28, 2004. 
41
Editors: Full Issue
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2014
Jonathan Cohen 
40   e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010) 
[43] Ibid. 
[44] Ibid. 
 
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work invites its readers' comments. Letters to the Editor regarding the 
content of any current issue can be sent to Gordon Babst gbabst@chapman.edu, placing "e-Research: A Journal of 
Undergraduate Work - reader comments" in the subject line. Selected reader comments and student responses 
will appear in the subsequent issue. 
42
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/e-Research/vol1/iss1/1
  Are Approval Ratings an Accurate Reflection of Success? 
Copyright © 2010 Michaela Dalton  e-Research, Vol 1, No 1 (2010)   41 
e-Research: A Journal of Undergraduate Work, Vol 1, No 1 (2010) 
HOME    ABOUT    USER HOME    SEARCH    CURRENT    ARCHIVES  
Home > Vol 1, No 1 (2010) > Dalton  
 
Are Approval Ratings an Accurate Reflection of Success? Effects of Media 
Coverage on Public Opinion of Colin Powell 
Michaela Dalton 
 
This paper will focus on issue salience, priming, and bias in order to determine the extent of the impact of media 
on those who are exposed to them, particularly in relation to coverage of former Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
Many studies explain these occurrences in relation to the presiding president, but little has been done in the way 
of observing the approval of the cabinet members. We would expect that in low-information environments, 
approval ratings are relatively constant and track the president; however, trends in Powell's rating do not support 
this idea. His ratings fluctuate and are independent of President George W. Bush's. To address this issue, the 
present study looks into the media coverage of former secretary of state Powell, using specific examples of tactics, 
tones, themes, and other variables present in the news. In doing so, it attempts to identify the specific 
characteristics of Powell's coverage, in general and in relation to Bush, that cause the interesting variations in 
public opinion polls.  
It is important to understand how the news media influence citizens and what methods they use to do so. There 
are three functions of the mass media, the first of which is surveillance (Leighley 2004). This means that the media 
are responsible for placing issues on the public agenda and are crucial for political success as they provide publicity 
and policy information. In presenting these certain issues, they also help to interpret events by putting them into 
context. Through this function of interpretation, the media help to shape opinion on certain issues. The third 
function is socialization, which teaches basic values and support for democracy; this is important because young 
people acquire most of their information from the mass media, and are thus influenced by it as they develop their 
own beliefs (Leighley 2004). So the effects of the media can impact the behavior of voters. Research has identified 
such examples as the "CNN effect," through which the media are able to stir up public opinion with extensive news 
coverage and dramatic pictures. In recognizing the potentiality of the media's sway, there should be concern about 
the possible negative results of their influence, such as bias. 
Bias is defined as "the opposite of accuracy, balance, and fairness" (Simon, Fico & Lacy 1989; Streckfuss 1990). 
Accuracy refers to observing only the facts of the matter, while balance is achieved by giving equal amounts of 
coverage to all parties and fairness results when all perspectives are presented with no one being more favorable 
than others (Simon, Fico & Lacy 1989; Streckfuss 1990). Fears of bias are not unfounded because opinions on 
political matters are widely divergent, and so political news bias can have a large impact due to its intent, 
relevance, and influence (D'Alessio & Allen 2000). According to a 2002 study by the Pew Research Center for the 
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People and the Press, 47% of participants believed the news media to be politically biased in their reporting, while 
only 35% disagreed. Although this large percentage suggests that the media is biased in one direction or another, 
whether the research supports this claim is questionable.  
On the one hand, journalists, as a whole, tend to identify themselves as liberal (D'Alessio & Allen 2000; Lee 2005), 
so it appears it would follow that stories are chosen and candidates are covered according to the political beliefs of 
reporters and editors (Levite 1996). These claims were made by many political figures such as Vice Presidents Spiro 
Agnew and Dan Quayle, as well as by presidential candidate Bob Dole (D'Alessio & Allen 2000). However, despite 
numerous studies, a clear link between reporters' political views and news coverage is yet to be discovered (Black, 
Steele & Barney 1999; Dennis 1997). This does not necessarily mean that the media is conservatively biased as 
many others have claimed. Media critic Michael Parenti (1996) identifies the functions of the news media as 
increasing profit for owners and investors, and promoting corporate economic dominance. For Parenti (1996) and 
other media observers like Alterman (2003), conservative voices dominate those of the liberal journalists, and any 
coverage that does not unanimously support this agenda is viewed as evidence of a liberal bias. Claims that the 
media is conservatively biased, however, are also rejected by research findings that news content does not reflect 
any significant or consistent partisan or issue favoritism (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt 1998; Dennis 1997). 
Despite findings that no ideological bias dominates the news media, the issue of media effects is still relevant 
because issues like salience and priming come into play. In essence, salience is "the extent to which a stimulus, or 
referent object in the surrounding situation, stands out from other stimuli, or from other aspects of the situation" 
(Augoustinos and Walker 1995). Spiro Kiousis (2004) asserts that salience can be internally or externally evident; 
the former refers to the internal qualities of the object while the latter refers to the external importance placed on 
it in relation to other issues. He argues that salience seems to be governed by both internal and external 
characteristics and presents the three dimensions of salience as attention, prominence, and valence. The most 
common is attention, which is externally grounded and entails media awareness of an object by sheer volume of 
stories and coverage. Prominence, also externally grounded, refers to the positioning of a story-placement, size, 
other aesthetic devices-within a media text to convey its importance (Kiousis 2004). The last dimension Kiousis 
(2004) addresses is valence, which is internally grounded in that it does not emphasis objects (issues, candidates, 
etc.), but those objects' attributes (description, qualities, etc.). 
Understanding salience is important because research shows that the media can influence the importance people 
ascribe to issues. By giving prominence to certain issues, the news media subtly shape opinion about what is the 
most important issue facing the country or community (Iyengar & Kinder 1987). Danny Hayes (2008) argues that 
salience is actually extremely important because people are highly resistant to persuasion and it is difficult to 
change their minds. With relatively well-established views, people interpret information in a way that is consistent 
with their beliefs and they ignore messages that conflict with them. Therefore, it is much easier to make certain 
issues more salient to viewers and readers (Hayes 2008). Because people experience little direct interaction with 
the political world, their perceptions of issue relevance are highly malleable (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972). When it comes time to make a decision, like voting, they rely on their memory to 
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provide relevant considerations (Kelley and Mirer 1974) because they cannot take a consensus of all the 
information they have on the subject (Simon 1955). The most accessible information are often the issues or 
candidate characteristics that receive news attention (Zaller and Feldman 1992). 
Along with this is the idea of priming, the activation of knowledge stored in long-term memory following exposure 
to a stimulus (Althaus & Kim 2006) that influences what issues citizens consider when making political assessments 
and decisions (Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Research shows that increasing a construct's accessibility alone does not 
necessarily produce knowledge activation; it is one of two factors, the second of which is the construct's 
applicability to the relevant task (Higgins 1996). Those issues that receive more coverage and are considered most 
important carry more weight than other issues-they are more accessible, less likely to change, and better 
understood than other issues (Krosnick 1990; Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Because priming alters the criteria used to 
evaluate political issues, events, and leaders, it has tremendous influence on election outcomes, public support, 
and approval ratings. 
Most important of the three to this paper is approval ratings. A study by Pan and Kosicki (1997) observed priming 
effects in relation to approval ratings of George H.W. Bush from 1990 to 1992, during which media coverage of the 
president focused on one of two things: the Gulf War issue, which contributed positively to his performance 
ratings, and the economy, which contributed negatively. The study shows that as each issue dominates the 
coverage, positive approval ratings coincide with more positive issue coverage and negative approval ratings 
coincide with more negative issue coverage. Pan and Kosicki (1997) argue that "this clearly recognizable positive or 
negative underpinning concerning Bush...might be the underlying force that moved people toward either a 
positive or negative direction in their evaluations of Bush." Therefore, increase in issue salience and valence are 
subject to priming and may be two factors in forming evaluations (Pan & Kosicki 1997).  
It is a well-established idea that priming does affect approval ratings. Thus, Kelleher and Wolak (2006) set out to 
determine which components of presidential evaluation are most vulnerable to priming effects. To do so, they 
identify two components-economic evaluations and character assessments-that are considered "easy" issues 
because even less politically involved citizens rely on them to evaluate the president; and two "hard" issues-
domestic policy preferences and foreign policy assessments-that are less familiar and less likely to be primed. 
Findings show that economic health and presidential character are easy for all people to consider in their 
judgments; matters of domestic and foreign policy, however, are much more difficult. Policy issues are usually 
much more specific, and it may be challenging to draw implications (Kelleher & Wolak 2006). Identifying the 
economy as good or bad is much more straightforward than doing the same for hard issues such as policies, 
education reform, and foreign affairs decisions. It has been shown that positive evaluations of domestic and 
foreign policy performance translate to higher presidential approval, and policy assessments are less likely to be 
primed in evaluations (Goidel, Shields, & Peffley, 1997; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Therefore, the specific category of 
issues addressed may affect how people perceive politicians. 
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Studying media effects on approval ratings is important and relevant. American presidents depend on public 
opinion to win support for their legislative and international initiatives, which are therefore important resources in 
attaining power and influencing Washington (Burden & Mughan 2003). On a gubernatorial level, approval has been 
shown to affect elections and help gain more support from the legislature (Cohen & King 2004). Because 
favorability ratings can have a large impact, there is a great need for further research on the topic, especially in 
areas that are lacking enough information, such as the effects of priming on evaluations of people other than the 
president. The present study regarding Colin Powell will be a start to explaining the connection between approval 
and media among the president's cabinet members.  
Data and Methods 
 
Most studies that observe media or priming effects choose candidates or presidents as case studies. To 
demonstrate application of the present theories, this paper will focus on neither candidate nor president, but on 
former secretary of state Colin Powell. Because Secretary of State is the first cabinet member in both the line of 
succession and order of precedence, it is arguably one of the most important of the secretaries. Colin Powell, 
specifically, was identified by a 2001 PEW survey to be the most visible Bush appointee, and so it makes sense to 
track his coverage, because it will be followed more than most, if not all, of the former Bush cabinet members. In 
order to observe the effects of priming on approval ratings, I collected approval ratings of the past secretary of 
state and former president George W. Bush during months where ratings are available for both, as well as New 
York Times newspaper articles covering Powell's performance while in office from 2001-2005. The New York Times 
Company owns an additional eighteen newspapers, a radio station, and over fifty websites. As the national 
newspaper of record, its viewership is large, and most people will get information either directly from the 
newspaper or indirectly from another news source that gets its content from the New York Times. All articles that 
were published in months when ratings are available and contain "Colin Powell" were reviewed and coded based 
on, among other variables, characteristics and issues discussed, techniques used, and overall tone. In the analysis, 
news coverage that did not substantially address the topic at hand was not included in the data set.[1] Content 
analysis on relevant articles was performed and grouped according to month so that trends in newspaper articles 
could be compared to trends in monthly favorability polls. The overall goal of this process is to observe the effects 
that media have on the way citizens view politicians; in other words, how priming influences public opinion and 
approval ratings. 
 
By choosing Powell specifically, I am able to address a key variable that needs further research, and that is the role 
of association with the presiding president. Poll data was converted into graphs to show the progressions of 
approval over time not only for former secretary of state Powell but also for former president George W. Bush. As 
a result, conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact that Bush's approval had on Powell's approval, and the 
hybrid effect of both media and political association on favorability. 
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Hypothesis 
 
Priming has been shown to have significant impacts on approval ratings (Pan and Kosicki 1997). While media play a 
crucial role in this, there are other variables to be considered. I propose that favorability shifts not only according 
to media coverage of the politician in question, but also those with whom he or she interacts and is associated. 
Therefore, Colin Powell's approval ratings will fluctuate as issue salience varies and as Bush receives more positive 
or negative coverage. Certain aspects of Powell's personal life and career, as well as his relationship with Bush, will 
be accessible, and because priming alters criteria used to evaluate political situations (Kelleher & Wolak 2006), 
they will alter public opinion in various ways. Regarding media coverage of Powell and his relationship with Bush, 
along with monthly favorability rating polls, I have developed five hypotheses: 
H1 The media will exert a temporal bias in their coverage of Powell's years as secretary of state; during the middle 
months, he will be passed over much more so than at the beginning and end. 
H2 News articles that specifically distinguish between Powell and Bush or other Republicans will have more 
positive tones. 
H3 Colin Powell and George W. Bush will be clearly separated when it comes to situations of aggression and force. 
H4 Powell will have the most favorable ratings when news does not associate the two. 
H5 Low approval ratings will coincide with negative media coverage. 
Except for when major events happen, there is little coverage of cabinet members during their term. I hypothesize 
that in this study, it is in the beginning and end periods that coverage of Powell will increase in both quantity and 
quality. 
 
The unfavorableness of the Bush administration is mirrored in public opinion ratings for many government officials 
such as Condoleeza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. Whether articles address these previous cabinet 
members or the former president, the specific stressing of a separation with Powell will lead to more positive 
tones for Powell. 
 
Bush is criticized as being aggressive and forceful in military and international affairs (Pape 2005). Powell, however, 
is much more moderate in his political views and has executive and military experience that makes him more 
deliberate. Therefore, articles in which Powell is portrayed as moderate in the use of force and aggression will 
specifically draw a distinction between the former president and secretary of state. 
 
Former president Bush is fairly unpopular; his favorability, during the months of focus, averages 62.6% as opposed 
to Powell's 78%, and so associations with him would be negative for Powell. I hypothesize that Powell's approval 
will go up when news deliberately distinguishes him from Bush. 
 
When it comes time to make a decision, the most accessible information are usually issues and characteristics that 
receive the most media attention (Zaller and Feldman 1992). If coverage of Powell is predominantly negative, then 
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people will most likely remember these negative qualities in making their evaluations. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that overall negative public opinion regarding Colin Powell will result when news addresses Powell in a negative 
tone and also discusses his faults and failures. 
 
Results 
 
The mere amount of news articles in major US publications reflects the claim made by Hypothesis 1 in that the 
beginning and end months-minus September of 2001 after the attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New 
York City -coincide with larger numbers of articles. Running any number of crosstabs with this data can help to test 
this hypothesis because it notes the prevalence of coverage at the beginning and end of Powell's career under the 
Bush administration. This seems to be the case with many of his characteristics. Integrity or honesty is only 
addressed in the first two and last two months (r=.38, p<.01); likewise, the variable labeled "not being forceful 
enough" is present in the first three and last two months (r=.22, p<.05). 
Figure 1 
 
  
Other instances of this occur in an article's drawing comparison of the present to the past. Throughout the first 
year of Powell's term, references were made to the past, especially in the context of his service in the Persian Gulf 
War and under the first Bush administration as seen in a number of New York Times articles, such as "Powell's 
Complex Record" (Rubin 23) and "The Bush All-Stars" (Editorial 18). The last year or so-seen in February and 
November of 2004 article data-also witnessed these references to the past, except in these cases, they looked back 
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on Powell's service under first administration of George W. Bush, from which he was resigning. Regardless, it is 
important to note that various variables show the same pattern. 
 
In order to determine which tones applicable to Hypothesis 2 were present in these articles, I ran a crosstab 
between positive tone toward Powell and "separate from Bush." The data showed that when Powell was 
specifically differentiated from Bush and his other close cabinet members, more articles had positive tones toward 
Powell and negative tones toward former president Bush (Figure 2, 3).  
  
Figure 2 
powell.positive * separate.from.bush.republicans Crosstabulation 
      separate.from.bush.republicans   
powell.positive     0 1 Total   
    Count 23 11 34   
% within 
separate.from.bush.republicans 
28.8% 36.7% 30.9%   
  
Figure 3 
bush.negative * separate.from.bush.republicans Crosstabulation 
      separate.from.bush.republicans 
bush.negative     0 1 Total 
    Count 11 14 25 
% within 
separate.from.bush.republicans 13.8% 46.7% 22.7% 
% of Total 10.0% 12.7% 22.7% 
  
  
More specifically, 36.7% were positive toward Powell under this condition, as opposed to 30.9% of all articles. 
Similarly, 46.7% of these articles expressed a negative tone toward Bush, while his overall negative tone was 
22.7%. This gap is even larger, and so it seems that there must be significance to the large differences in both. 
 
In order to determine if Hypothesis 3 is correct in asserting that Bush and Powell will be separated regarding 
aggression, I ran a crosstab between month and "separate from Bush and other Republicans," including "not 
aggressive enough" as a layer. Although I can make no significant conclusions about monthly occurrences, data 
shows that 61.1% of articles that suggest Powell is not pressing or forceful enough separate him from Bush (r=.34, 
p<.01).  
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Figure 4 
Month * separate.from.bush.republicans * not.aggressive.enough Crosstabulation 
not.aggressive.enough 
separate.from.bush.republicans 
0 1 Total 
      Count 7 11 18 
% of Total 38.9% 61.1% 100.0% 
  
  
This occurrence is especially common in November of 2004, just after Powell announced his resignation. In "Colin 
Powell's Redeeming Failures" (Isaacson 27), there is discussion of disappointment by Bush loyalists in Powell's lack 
of support for the Bush strategies that led to occupation of Iraq, and his role in the Bush administration is 
described as a "push for a little bit more realism." Powell is noted to be a counterweight to Donald Rumsfeld's 
drive to win (Safire 29) and the "voice of reason in foreign policy" (Kristof 29). Most of these comments are 
positive, which can explain Powell's high ratings. Of the articles that address these two variables, 44.4% have an 
overall negative tone toward Bush. A favorability poll taken just after he announced his resignation determined his 
rating to be 87%, which is just short of his post-9/11 high. Therefore, although many might consider "not pressing 
enough" to be a negative quality, newspaper articles reveal that it was actually a positive variable because it was 
used to contrast with Bush. 
  
Articles that separate Powell from Bush were the starting point for determining how dissociation with Bush affects 
approval (Hypothesis 4). The months with the highest percentage of this occurrence are August 2003, October 
2003, December 2003, and November 2004. However, favorability ratings taken at these times range from 70 to 
74, which is not particularly high compared to Powell's usual ratings (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 
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But once again, data analysis for November 2004 goes against the norm; 64% of these articles separate Powell 
from Bush, and Powell has an all time high rating of 88%. Because it is only evident in this month, Hypothesis 4 is 
not supported. 
  
A crosstab between month and overall negative tone toward Powell was performed to test Hypothesis 5. Presence 
of negative tones is much more common during the months that offer lower favorability ratings (p<.1), which fall 
between August of 2003 and February of 2004 of this data set (Figure 6).  
  
Figure 6 
Month * powell.negative Crosstabulation 
      powell.negative 
      0 1 Total 
Month January 2001 Count 12 1 13 
% within powell.negative 12.8% 6.2% 11.8% 
July 2001 Count 8 1 9 
% within powell.negative 8.5% 6.2% 8.2% 
September 2001 Count 13 1 14 
% within powell.negative 13.8% 6.2% 12.7% 
December 2002 Count 10 1 11 
% within powell.negative 10.6% 6.2% 10.0% 
April 2003 Count 12 1 13 
% within powell.negative 12.8% 6.2% 11.8% 
August 2003 Count 3 1 4 
% within powell.negative 3.2% 6.2% 3.6% 
October 2003 Count 7 1 8 
% within powell.negative 7.4% 6.2% 7.3% 
December 2003 Count 3 1 4 
% within powell.negative 3.2% 6.2% 3.6% 
February 2004 Count 5 4 9 
% within powell.negative 5.3% 25.0% 8.2% 
November 2004 Count 21 4 25 
% within powell.negative 22.3% 25.0% 22.7% 
  
A second crosstab with "failed duties"-which includes lack of success, disappointment in performance, and overall 
tones of regret-yielded interesting findings (r=.42, p<.01).  
  
Over the course of Powell's first three years as secretary of state, no New York Times articles indicated that the 
secretary of state had somehow failed in his responsibilities. However, there is a gradual increase in themes of 
failure in late 2003; 12.5% of articles in October 2003, 25% in December 2003, 33.3% in February 2004, and 32% in 
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November 2004. Through October and December, there is a definite drop in Powell's respective ratings of 70% and 
74%, which were at 81% in April of 2003 (Pew). Additionally, just as his rating was lowest in February 2004 (65%), 
the percentage of failed duty incidents was 33.3 and that of negative tone incidents was 44.4, both of which are 
the highest of all other months (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 
  
The only thing that cannot be explained by this is the fact that in November 2004, 32% of articles addressed 
Powell's failure, but his favorability ratings were at 87%, one of the highest they had ever been. This gap can be 
explained by the content and timing of the news articles, which are written during the month that Powell resigns. 
The fact that they were written at this time makes them the exception to the rule because of such special 
circumstances. Most articles that refer to his failure do so in a reminiscence of his time as secretary of state, and so 
it makes sense that the scope of Powell's performance reached both success and failure. For example, "Imagining 
How Powell Might Still Have a Job" (Purdum 4) denotes disappointment that Powell missed out on succeeding 
Clinton, and "Powell at the Exit: A Debate Over His Legacy" (Vinson 28) claims that he has been one of the lease 
effective modern secretaries of state. Aside from this exception, overall negative tones and suggestions of failure 
have a significant impact on favorability ratings. 
  
Discussion 
By using content analysis of New York Times articles that address Colin Powell, many connections were made 
between certain tactics and overall tones or favorability ratings. First, it is clear that a temporal bias exists in the 
coverage because the number of articles and number of specific details within those articles are higher at the 
beginning and end of Powell's time in office. This suggests, in accordance with priming research, that approval 
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ratings will most likely be higher or lower than normal at these times, depending on whether coverage is positive 
or negative. 
 
Simply separating Powell from Bush in coverage does not have a consistent effect on approval. Instead, it is when 
this separation is taken into consideration with other factors that conclusions can be drawn. For example, 
November 2004 ratings are among the highest for Powell, and there are many instances in which journalists draw 
a distinction between Bush and Powell. Because these results do not match up with the other months, it seems 
that another variable is at work. November's articles predominantly, in separating the two, yield negative tones 
toward Bush, and so it makes sense that in this case favorability would be higher. Another example is 
demonstrated through observations of tone. When an article specifically cites a distinction between the two, 
overall positive tones toward Powell increase and overall negative tones toward Bush increase. Therefore, most 
articles that separate the two tend to speak more highly and offer a positive image of Powell, while looking down 
on Bush. 
 
Separation between the two also has a strong relationship with aggression and force. When Powell is described as 
lacking force or not utilizing pressure in his foreign affairs, news clearly alludes to a separation from former 
president Bush. Given the previous finding, this suggests that when news mentions Powell as lacking aggression, it 
is not negative, but instead positive because articles that distinguish between them are more likely to favor Powell.  
  
These observations defined the two biggest predictors of lower ratings for Powell to be mention of failed duties 
and negative tones. The months in which he is least favorable coincide with the months that most often address 
these issues. This shows a distinct pattern and suggests that negative media coverage, due to the effects of 
salience and priming, can have a significant impact on approval ratings.  
  
Powell's public opinion ratings cannot be explained as a matter of whether he receives coverage and whether he is 
associated with Bush, but in relation to coverage of specific issues. In other words, attention and prominence-the 
two externally grounded dimensions of salience-are not present, but the internally grounded valence is. Patterns in 
the news show that issues are selectively made salient by the media. As demonstrated in this study of Powell, 
certain variables influence tones, which impact approval ratings. As a result of priming, individuals specifically 
recall what stands out in coverage when making evaluations. Though Powell's ratings were not directly affected by 
the amount of coverage he received-both alone and in comparison with Bush-, they were influenced by Bush's 
presence within the specific variables that received focus (e.g. separation from Bush, situations of aggression and 
force, etc.). Overall findings show that Bush, through these variables, was oftentimes used as a contrast to Powell 
in order to highlight Powell's success and competency. Therefore, the way the president is addressed in relation to 
the cabinet members is extremely important in predicting their favorability ratings. Given this information, it 
would be interesting for future studies to investigate in what way public opinion and approval impacted foreign 
policy making. 
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Undergraduate Work - reader comments" in the subject line. Selected reader comments and student responses 
will appear in the subsequent issue. 
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